Could the Iranian Revolution Happen Again?

By Joe Clark

Photo Credit: The McGill International Review

INTRO

In August 1978, the CIA reported that “Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a ‘pre-revolutionary’ situation,” to President Jimmy Carter. Roughly six months later, the secular dictatorship that had ruled Iran had fallen and a new Islamic government was in power. The recent Iranian protest movement, like the Iranian Revolution of the past, has caught the world by surprise, leading many to wonder if the current government would suffer the same fate.

The 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising was widely considered to be the most serious challenge the Islamic Republic had faced since its founding in 1979. For almost 50 years, Shia Ayatollahs have ruled Iran as a theocratic dictatorship with strictly enforced gender segregation and harsh repression against dissent. When other protest waves occurred in the past, they were generally focused on the short term or economic goals. These protests, on the other hand, challenged the country's foundations and pushed for the establishment of a democratic government, with many experts comparing them to the events of the 1979 Revolution which overthrew the US-backed Pahlavi Regime.

While the 2022 uprising was ultimately crushed after roughly a year by brute force, the grievances that caused it have persisted and the continuation of passive resistance could mean further mass dissent could develop in the near future. This article will analyze the factors of the 1979 Revolution's success and to see if they occur in the present day. While the protests of 2022 were unlikely to recreate the success of the Iranian Revolution, they carry the potential to build networks that could challenge the government.

IRANIAN REVOLUTION HISTORY

Despite the murderous and oppressive reputation the Islamic Republic of Iran has gained since its founding, it was brought to power by a primarily peaceful mass movement – the Iranian Revolution. The revolution emerged as a response to a growing feeling of discontent towards the Shah of Iran for his economic and social liberalization projects, which led to economic ruin for many Iranians and were seen as foreign and un-Islamic by Iran’s Shia clerics.

Although the Shah had suppressed nearly all forms of political organization, a network of mosques and bazaar merchants survived, serving as the catalyst for the rapid mobilization in the Revolution, led by exiled dissident Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The first protests began in 1977 and were organized by religious groups. The network was particularly effective in urban areas, as students, impoverished people, workers, bazaar merchants, and clerics all lived in close proximity.

The demonstrations were accompanied by a general strike. The security forces cracked down on the demonstrators, which proved to be a grave mistake. In the Shia tradition, mourning ceremonies are held 40 days after a death, therefore protest followed a 40 day pattern in which the mourning of victims became a demonstration itself – one which was suppressed with force, producing more victims and the cycle repeating itself 40 days later.

This process was glorified in Shia culture as it emphasized personal sacrifice and social justice. The cycle continued through 1978, with the demonstrations growing in size. While the Shah offered generous concessions in comparison to most autocrats facing resistance to their rule, continued repression meant continued rallies. 

As waves of strikes and demonstrations endured, tactical nonviolent strategies began to emerge. Cassette tapes of Khomeini’s speeches were smuggled, copied, and played in mosques across the nation. Khomeini emphasized methods such as strikes, tax boycotts, and stay-aways when faced with harsh repression, meaning the revolution could survive even as the regime attempted to provoke them into violence or suppress them on the streets. Workers from across different sectors, especially the oil industry which produced much of the nation’s revenue, were able to paralyze the country through strikes and also sabotage the Shah’s counter-efforts such as cutting off power during the Shah’s televised speeches.

It wasn’t just the tactical genius of the revolutionaries that led to their victory, but the blunders of their enemies. The Shah made a fatal mistake in September 1978 when he allowed the Islamists to hold an Eid demonstration, only to crack down on protestors the next day. The Eid demonstration had created cross-cutting mobilization as more people felt it was safe to join the Islamists in protest. The crackdown on “Black Friday” nevertheless, produced a large number of casualties and led to the rebels switching to strike waves.

Despite the Shah attempting to crush the revolution through martial law, it was impossible to enforce as there was not enough room in prisons to hold demonstrators, and the government could not adequately run the industries that workers had abandoned. The opposition did not attack security forces, insteading appealing for them to defect, setting up an organization to protect defecting soldiers and sending officers back into the armed forces to gather intelligence. Just before the declaration of neutrality, the army stated they were running at only half capacity.

In January 1979, the Shah, dying of cancer, fled the country and Khomeini returned. He quickly set up a parallel government and called on officials from the monarchy to defect. When soldiers began to mutiny in February, demonstrators assisted and defended them from the rest of the military. Finally, on February 11th, 1979, the military declared neutrality in the dispute between the regime and the rebellion.The regime would soon surrender, giving Khomeini and the parallel government control of the country. 

BARRIERS TODAY

As the current Islamist regime was established through a popular uprising, they have taken active steps to curtail the influence of activists, through the use of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The regular armed forces, a professional fighting force which has held strong nationalist sentiments throughout its existence, could support revolutionary causes if convinced. The IRGC on the other hand, has become fanatically loyal to the regime, through a lucrative network of economic patronage. The IRGC represents the militaristic fundamentalism that protesters opposed.  It is further augmented by the Basij, a civilian auxiliary group with membership in the hundreds of thousands which acts as a plainclothes militia in emergencies. 

The 2022 uprising was crushed by way of these two organizations, their fanatical fighters being far less likely to defect while on the frontlines. Revolutionaries as a result have been placed in a tough position, unable to encourage widespread desertion of security forces as seen in 1979. Nevertheless, there are still avenues which they could exploit. While the IRGC is better equipped and favored by the regime, the regular armed forces are much larger, have lower pay, face discrimination from the IRGC, and are primarily composed of conscripts. While not to the levels seen during the Revolution, these factors could be used to persuade soldiers to defect, weakening the position of the regime. Additionally, another factor has been the level of organization. The Mosque-Bazaar network that facilitated the 1979 Revolution had been a large political force in the country for decades beforehand (Rulers, Rebels and Rogues) and had facilitated previous revolts. Aside from that, Khomeini was able to establish himself as a clear leader of the network and unite its various rebel groups,  provide direction to the movement and ensure effective cooperation in countering the government.

The 2022 protests lacked such networks. The clergy now rules, and while bazaars participated in the uprising, it has steadily lost public influence over the past few decades. A clear and powerful leader has not yet emerged either. The most likely candidate is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah which many Iranians pledged support to during the uprising. Despite his popularity, especially with the younger generation who seek a return to the relative freedom enjoyed under Pahlavi rule, he lacks the institutions and structures within the country to turn this support into action.

Nevertheless, new tools, such as the internet, can supply Iranians a means to assemble. Although the regime has attempted to censor or cut off access to the web, protesters have been able to continue to communicate and coordinate using VPNs and satellite terminals. Also, organized labor continues to be a potent force sympathetic to the country’s opposition, potentially with the capability to bring down the national economy through mass strikes. Finally, while Iran’s clergy has been uncompromising, some lower-level religious leaders have been sympathetic to the demands of the protesters. These calls could spread through the establishment, encouraging it to take a more conciliatory position, or splinter it, reducing the religious legitimacy of the regime. Nevertheless, if the Islamic Republic falls or considerably changes its political structures, it holds significant ramifications for its interactions across the Middle East, especially with its vast networks of proxies.

Ultimately, the current fight for Iranian protests has been an uphill battle, in a sociopolitical environment much different than in 1979. The theocratic government has taken steps to fortify its institutions, allowing it to break up dissent more so than the Shah ever could and has taken a more uncompromising approach towards the opposition than the Shah ever did. But a new method of building solidarity has emerged through internet communication, and has helped the opposition utilize existing mobilization networks, such as organized labor, to challenge the government. While a revolution is still unlikely, it is certainly not impossible. After all, the CIA didn’t believe that the 1979 Revolution had any chance of succeeding, perhaps the same will be true this time. 

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